Husserl, Language and the Ontology of the Act by Smith, Barry
204 EVA PICARDI 
Veraart, Albert. 1976. "Geschichte des wissenschaftlichen NachlassesGottlob Freges und seiner Edition: Mit einem Katalog des urspriingli­chen Bestands der nachgelassenen Schriften Freges". Schirn 1976. I. 49-106.
Weyl, Hermann. 1966. Philosophie der Mathematik und Naturwissen­
schaft. Miinchen & Wien: Oldenbourg. 
Windelband, Wilhelm. 1884. Praludien: Aufsatze und Reden zur Philo­
sophie und ihrer Geschichte. 2 vols. Tiibingen: Mphr. --. 1892. Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie. 15th ed. revisedand enlarged by Heinz Heimsoeth. (Repr. of the 13th. ed. of 1935.Tiibingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1980.) 
Wundt, Wilhelm, 1880-83. Logik: Eine Untersuchung der Prinzipien der
Erkenntnis und der Methoden wissenschaftlicher Forschung. Vol. I: 
Erkenntnislehre. Vol. II: Methodenlehre. Stuttgart: F. Enke. (2nd re­vised ed. 1893, 1894-95.) 
Ziehen, Theodor. 1920. Lehrbuch der Logik auf positivistischer Grund­
/age mit Berucksichtigung der Geschichte der Logik. Bonn: A. Mar­cus/E. Weber. (Repr., Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1974.)Zweig, Arnulf. 1967. "Sigwart, Christoph". The Encyclopedia of Phi­
losophy ed. by Paul Edwards, vol. VII, 441-442. New York: Macmil­lan. 
HUSSERL, LANGUAGE, AND THE ONTOLOGY OF THE ACT 
BARRY SMITH 1 
University of Manchester 
The objection that we are attempting here a restitution of 
the Aristotelian-scholastic logic, on whose inferior value 
history has pronounced judgment, should not perturb us. 
Perhaps it may yet turn out that the discipline in question 
is by no means so narrow in scope and so poor in pro­
found problems as it is reproached with being. Perhaps 
traditional logic was merely a highly imperfect and dim 
realization of the idea of pure logic, but none the less 
competent and worthy of respect as a first beginning 
(Husserl, "Prolegomena to Pure Logic", § 13). 
1. Tasks of an Ontology of Language
The term 'ontology' has played a role in recent discussions of lan­
guage and linguistics almost exclusively in connection with the problem 
of the so-called 'ontological commitments' of a linguistic theory. In the 
present paper however the term 'ontology' is used in a way that is at 
once more modest and more ambitious. It is more modest,, because on­
tology will be understood not as a higher-order investigation of e.g. lin­
guistic theories, but as a discipline having as its subject-matter the ob­
jects themselves, which such theories investigate. It is more ambitious, 
because it will extend beyond 'language' as narrowly conceived to in­
clude also, for example (in conformity with an older tradition of universal 
grammar), the acts and actions of language-using subjects. Indeed we 
may say that the ontology of language is concerned precisely with the re­
lations between uses of language, both overt and covert, and other enti­
ties, whether in the world or in the mind of the subject. 
A first survey of the sorts of relations which might come into ques­
tion for such an ontology would include: 
(a) relations between a referring use of an expression and its object, 2 
From D. Buzzetti and M. Ferriani, eds., Speculative Grammar, Universal Grammar, and 
Philosophical Analysis of Language, Amsterdam: John Benjamins (1987), 205-227
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(b) relations between the use of a (true) sentence and that in the 
world which makes it true, 3 
(c) relations between a used predicate and the object or objects of 
which it is predicated, and also, at least in certain cases, between this 
object and those of its parts and moments in virtue of which the predi-
cate holds, 
(d) relations among uses of language themselves, f~r example ana-
phoric relations, relations between those events which are referring and 
predicating uses of expressions, relations between successive uses of sen-
tences in higher-order structures such as narratives, arguments, conver-
sations, and so on. 
I .shall have something to say about all of these species of examples 
in :,vhat follows. My main concern, however, will be with the ways in 
which uses of language are bound up with mental acts. Thus for exam-
ple I shall be concerned with: 
(e) relations between mental acts on the one hand and underlying 
mental states (attitudes, beliefs), on the other, 
(f) relations between my acts and states and those associated uses of 
language which are overt actions on my part, for example actio.ns of 
promising or of asking questions, 
(g) relations between my mental acts and states and the overt actions 
(including utterances) of other subjects with whom I come into contact 
(relations of understanding, of communication). 
It is remarkable how few analytic philosophers have attempted to de-
scribe any of these relations in more than merely metaphorical terms -
as if language, narrowly conceived as a system of abstract types, would 
exist in splendid isolation from mental and other sorts of structure. Pro-
ponents of causal and historical theories of names have taken some ini-
tial steps in connection with (a), but their accounts .are too narrowly 
causal, and often little more than promissory notes. Advocates of the se-
mantics of natural language have done some work in the areas of (c) 
and _(d), but _the analytic philosopher's understanding of the object-
predicate relation has advanced not at all since Frege conceived his pecu-
liar function-argument interpretation. Moreover, work on the interrela-
tions between successive uses of language, at least on the part of the 
more philosophically mi11ded theorists of language, has been concentra-
ted overwhelmingly on those cases which can be pressed within the sche-
mata of one or other orthodox system of logic. Some work, especially 
that associated with the names of Grice, Schiffer, Strawson, has been 
done by analytic philosophers on the interconnections between language 
and associated mental acts, and proponents of speech act(ion) theory 
have made some headway in particular with parts of (f) and (g), but their 
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accounts do not mesh at all with any worked-out ontology: they resolve 
into elucidations of certain logical relations between sentences (promise 
S is felicitous iff...), and throw little light on how speech act(ion)s are 
structured in such a way as to be bound up in more complex wholes 
with those mental events which are acts and those mental states which 
are beliefs convictions, desires, etc. 
There i~ one philosophical tradition, however, which did concern it-
self precisely with the whole range of relations of the given sort. It is the 
tradition which began with the work of Franz Brentano (1838-1917) and 
his students above all Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), Carl Stumpf (1848-
· 1936) and Anton Marty (1847-1914), and reached its high-p_oint i~ ~he 
Logical Investigations of Edmund Husser~ (1859-1938). Th~s trad1t10n 
was carried forward in philosophy by reahst phenomenolog1sts such as 
Johannes Daubert (1877-1947) and Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) and in 
linguistics by such thinkers as Roman Jakobson (1896-1983) ~nd Ka:l 
Buhler (1879-1964). The present essay is a brief survey of the philosoph1-
cal work on language by the members of this tradition, together with a 
comparison of the results of their work with other, competing approaches. 
2. Species and Generality 
Of central importance for what follows will be the theory of depen-
dence-relations set forth, in germ, in Husserl's third Logical Investiga-
tion and anticipated by Brentano in his lectures of 1887-91 on Deskrip-
tive Psychologie. 4 Each of the various different relat~ons mentione_d 
above can be understood in the terms of this ontology, m a way that 1s 
at once elegant and economical. Before presenting Husserl's views on de-
pendence, however, it will be useful to make some more gener~l remar~s 
on the subject of generality: for the opposition between species and in-
stance between what is general and what is particular, will turn out to 
be fuddamental to the entire project of a theory of language in the Hus-
serlian sense. 
Imagine that we are called upon to look at the wor~d as a _zoologist, 
or a phonologist, or a warehouse manager, or a fmgerprmt expert 
might. We notice very soon that some features of the _world ~re c?n-
stant while others vary. It is important not to import philosoph1cal s1m-
plifi;ations - of either what one might call the Platonistic or the nomi-
nalist sort - into the description of this fact. Constancy occurs not ?e-
cause there are, in addition to individual realia, abstract essences wh1c? 
somehow reappear, indentically, in different objects. And nor does it 
occur because of. some not further explicable propensity of subjects to 
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use general terms in certain ways. Constancy occurs, rather - or at 
least this is the core of the Brentano-Husserl view - because objects 
have real parts or moments ('respects') which stand to each other in rela-
tions of perfect similarity. 5 These may be moments of the most· simple 
sort, for example moments of colour or taste. (The sentence 'Hans's 
arm is the same colour as Bruno's leg' is made true by the perfect simi-
larity between the individual colour-moments inhering in their respective 
limbs.) Or they may be more complex, higher-order structures founded 
upon these. (The sentence 'the~e two sequences of whistles are perfor-
mances/instances of the same melody' is made true by a relation of per-
fect similarity between certain Gestalt-qualities inhering in the respective 
quantities of sound-material.) 
In virtue of such relations of perfect similarity, which may obtain on 
different levels, objects are gathered into classes of actual and possible 
similars called by Husserl 'species'. Such species are not additional ab-
stract entities. Rather, talk of species is to be cashed out in terms of re-
lations of similarity between certain real parts and moments of entities 
on the level of what is concrete and contingent. 
This deflationary interpretation of Husserl's thinking on species and 
generality is controversial. The issue is confused by the fact that one 
important aim of the Logical Investigations was to attack psychologism 
in logic, and particularly in volume I of the work - the "Prolegomena 
to Pure Logic" - where Husserl is concerned to dramatise the inade-
quacies of psychologism, he seems to put forward a Platonistic view of 
the nature of species as 'ideal singulars', a view which contrasts, to 
some extent, with the similarity view sketched above. When we look 
more carefully at Husserl's use of the species concept in the body of the 
work, however, then it becomes clear that his motives for introducing 
talk of species are not those of the Platonist. Indeed he pours scorn on 
Platonism in the traditional sense - on the view that species are real en-
tities (LU II § 7) - and he spends little time reflecting on species them-
selves or on their ontological properties. He is much rather concerned 
with the instances of species and with the problem of finding a means of 
doing justice to the manifold sorts of constancy or regularity and to the 
manifold sorts of law-governed connection that we encounter among 
such instances, both in the world and in our mental acts. 
Why, then, did Husserl utilise this terminology of species at all? This 
was, I think, for two reasons. First, it is the basis of Husserl's theory of 
logic (a) that logic is a science having its own specific subject-matter, 
and (b) that this subject-matter should not be a matter of empirically oc-
curring instances but of entities somehow outside the world of what 
happens and is the case. Logic is a science of thinkings, inferrings, rea-
T 
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sonings in specie: it is a science of the relations between species of these 
given sorts (see e.g. LU II § 2). Second, it was important to Husserl's 
theory that the real relations of similarity amongst logical entities do not 
occur as it were at random, but that they themselves exhibit a certain order. 
In particular, they manifest a hierarchical structure, so that species are in-
cluded in other species at higher levels of generality, the corresponding 
predicates being organised into trees of determinables and determinates. 
This is a property of universals that was taken for granted by logicians of a 
more traditional bent, from Aristotle and Porphyry to W.E. Johnson. 6 
3. Husserl's Theory of Dependence and its Linguistic Applications 
We are now in a position where we can say something about Hus-
serl's theory of dependence, which is all of a piece with his theory of 
species. For Husserl recognised that there are, in addition to the vertical 
(inclusion) relations between species, certain sorts of lateral relations, 
sharing with them important modal properties. Examples of the vertical 
relations would be: 
every instance of the species red is also an instance of the species colour; 
every instance of the species mammal is also an instance of the species animal; 
every instance of the species judgment is also an instance of the species mental act. 
Such relations involve moving from one species to another along given 
branches of a single species-tree. They can be more or less satisfactorily 
captured by means of the familiar inclusion relation of standard set 
theory. Lateral relations, in contrast, involve moving from one branch 
to another, or perhaps even moving to a wholly different tree. Such re-
lations, even when conceived merely extensionally, fall outside standard 
set theory or any of its more usual extensio~s. Examples of such lateral 
relations are: 
no instance of the species funeral occurs, without a prior and associated instance of 
the species death; 
no instance of the species colour exists, without a simultaneous and associated in-
stance of the species visual extension; 
no instance of the species phoneme is also an instance of the. species edible thing; 
no instance of the species red coincides with (occupies the same spatio-temporal 
area as) an instance of the species green. 
These relations are, in Husserl's terminology, relations of dependence 
and of necessary exclusion or incompatibility. Such relations are of 
course in a certain sense trivial (no less trivial, indeed, than the vertical 
or analytic relations which are· captured in the arbor porphyriana of the 
I' 
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traditional sort). This does not mean, however, that they can be ig-
nored; and nor, either, does it mean that there is not a great advantage 
to be derived in embedding them within a theoretical framework within 
which their status can be clarified and their character of apparent arbi-
trariness removed. 7 The theory of such relations has indeed been shown, 
in as yet unpublished work by Kit Fine, to yield a mathematical frame-
work of some elegance and complexity, though it would take us too far 
from our main concerns to develop the details of the theory here. 8 Suf-
fice it to point out that Husserl distinguishes between one-sided and reci-
procal dependence, e.g. between the one-sided dependence of an instance 
of the species musical tone on an instance of the species temporal du-
ration, and the three-sided mutual dependence of instances of the species 
pitch, timbre and loudness within a given tone. 
Such n-fold dependence relations correspond to n-fold dimensions of 
variation in the space of objects governed by the relations in question. 
Husserl's own fourth Investigation is in fact an application of the theory 
of dependence to the relations structuring the space of meaningful uses· 
of language. Uses of language can be divided, at different levels, into 
(relatively) dependent and (relatively) independent, in a way that can be 
shown to generate a categorial order of types of such uses (i.e. of the 
various 'parts of speech'), Thus Husserl's work on the laws governing 
dependent and independent meanings influenced the development of cat-
egorial grammar by Lesniewski and Ajdukiewicz (see Smith & Mulligan 
1982, § 5), and the idea of a grammatical theory built up on the basis of 
a theory of the dependence relations between parts of sentences has since 
been developed formally by linguists such as. Mel'cuk and Hudson as al-
ternatives to grammars of the more familiar transformational sort. 9 All 
of these grammars, however, exploit theoretical resources weaker than 
those available to Husserl, since they employ exclusively the notion of 
unilateral dependence or its equivalents. The idea of a dependence or 
categorial grammar utilising also relations of mutual dependence is cur-
rently in process of investigation by W. Haas. 
Husserl's theory of dependence was employed also by the linguist Ro-
man Jakobson, above all in his work on distinctive features in phonolo-
gy and on implicational universals of language acquisition (see Holen-
stein 1976). But its most thorough-going application was carried out by 
the Munich phenomenologist Adolf Reinach in his "Die apriorischen 
Grundlagen des biirgerlichen Rechts" of 1913. Reinach's work is, not-
withstanding its somewhat misleading title, an investigation of the onto-
logy of those complex structures which are actions of promising, com-
manding, forgiving, questioning, and so on, structures· which straddle 
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prudence and the theory of action. A good case can indeed be made for' 
the claim that Reinach, already in 1913, had set forth the essential ele-
ments of what later came to be called the theory of speech acts. His 
work even contains a discussion of the various 'infelicities' to which 
speech acts can be subjected, not, however, in terms of any quasi-logical 
'conditions of satisfaction', but rather in terms of a theory of the va-
rious possible sorts of ontological modifications which structures invol-
ving speech acts may undergo, a theory which is then applied also to 
throw light on the ways in which such structures may be affected by de-
terminations of the positive law. 10 
4. Acts and their Distinctive Features 
It is Husserl's own application of his theory of species and depen-
dence to the problem of linguistic meaning which will engage our atten-
tion for the remainder of this paper. Husserl's theory of meaning in the 
Logical Investigations is an act-based theory. Language is seen as having 
meaning only to the extent that there are subjects who bestow meanings 
upon specific expressions in specific sorts of mental acts. 11 Before we 
can present this theory, however, we shall need to say something about 
the internal structures of mental acts in general. 
Internal structure is captured by recognising dependence relations 
amongst really existing parts. Thus every act, according to Husserl, ma-
nifests the three distinctive features of quality, matter and intuitive act-
content. These three features stand in a three-sided dependence relation: 
no instance of the species act quality can exist except in a larger whole 
in which it is bound up with instances of the species matter and intuitive 
content, and these in turn cannot exist without each other and without 
an instance of the species act quality.' The space of acts is in this sense 
three-dimensional. 12 
· The quality of an act is the way in which the act is intentionally di-
rected towards its object: categorially or hypothetically, in perception or 
in imagination, and so on. The matter of an act is that feature of the 
act in virtue of which its object is given as an F or as a G: as a flower 
or· as a rose, as a noise or as an explosion, as inviting or as threatening, 
and so on. 13 . And the intuitive content (which Husserl also refers to as 
'hyletic data') is that feature which embraces all that is sensuously given 
in the act, including, for an act of language-use, sensuous signs (words, 
or such constituents of thoughts as correspond to words). 
What does Husserl mean when he says that an act exhibits these three 
distinctive features? Consider an act of seeing an apple. This act can be 
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imagined as varying in (at least) three different ways: I can imagine my-
self turning away from the apple and remembering exactly what I saw. 
My act of remembering then has a matter and intuitive content that are 
similar to those of the perceptual act on which it is founded. The quality 
of the act of memory, however, is quite different from that of the per-
ception that precedes it. Similarly, I can imagine myself seeing. the ap-
ple, but in such a way that what I (think I) see is a pear. Here quality 
and intuitive content are the same, but the matter is different. Or I can 
imagine myself seeing the apple e.g. under different lighting conditions. 
Quality and matter are thereby fixed, while intuitive content varies. Or 
again: suppose that I make two different assertions, one after the other. 
Here the qualities involved in my two acts are the same, the matters dif-
fer. If, on the other hand, I assert p and then subsequently wonder whe-
ther p, then the matters are the same, the qualities differ. 
Quality, matter and intuitive content can themselves in turn be inter-
nally complex. Thus consider the intuitive content of an act of percep-
tion of a musical tone. Here we discover at least three abstractly distin-
guishable parts of the content, corresponding to the three abstractly di-
stinguishable features of the tone - its pitch, timbre and loudness -
mentioned above. Just as these features reflect dimensions of variation 
in the tone, so the corresponding parts of the intuitive content reflect di-
mensions of variation in the act. And it is easy to see that, as with the 
tone,· so also with the act, each part or feature is such that, as a matter 
of necessity, it cannot exist in isolation from the others. 
Importantly, this claim is not affected by the fact that there are many 
of us who hear tones but do not know that we thereby also hear, say, 
timbre (who do not know what timbre is). For the existence of an act 
part is not to be confused with its being noticed or recognised: the fact 
that a subject is not able to identify, discriminate or name parts, mo-
ments or features of his acts is irrelevant to the question whether or not 
they are there. 14. If Fritz can hear a difference between a violin tone and 
an oboe tone of the same pitch and intensity, then his act contains a 
timbre-component. He needs only to hear the difference, not say or re-
cognise what it consists in. As we shall see, this is one dimension of the 
ontology of the act - we shall encounter others below - to which phe-
nomenology would seem to be inadequate. For the dimensions of acts, 
like the dimensions of musical tones, are in some sense objective; they 
are independent of what an individual or a society notices, or of what a 
natural language expresses. 
It has been assumed in all of the above that mental acts are internally 
complex spatio-temporal entities whose features instantiate· species (in 
the sense of our discussion in § 2). This holds in particular of acts of be-
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stowing meaning upon expressions, which are simply those acts which 
do the job of supplying objects for the expressions in question. These 
objects are things, events, processes, etc., in the case of nominal expres-
sions, states of affairs in the case of judgments. Such 'objectifying acts', 
too, manifest the three dimensions of matter, quality and intuitive con-
tent, a fact which Husserl exploits to produce his own, quite specific ac-
count of linguistic meaning. He argues, in fact, that linguistic meanings· 
are, just, certain species: they are, roughly, the species of those acts 
which are acts of meaning-bestowal. 15 Two immediate advantages of 
this theory can be pointed out immediately. The first is trivial, relating 
to an ambiguity in our use of the verb 'express'. Thus on the one hand 
we are accustomed to saying that uses of language express their (ideal, 
abstract) meanings, and on the other hand that such uses express certain 
acts on the part of the language-using subject. This ambiguity is not a 
matter of accident, on Husserl's theory; it flows directly from the fact 
that act and meaning relate to each other as instance to species. The se-
cond advantage relates to uses of language in communication. If Erna 
understands what Hans says, then whilst Hans's and Erna's thoughts are 
numerically distinct internally complex events, they are yet such that, in 
virtue of the similarity of their matters (and therefore also of their ob-
jects), they are instances of one and the same species (at some point on 
the meaning tree). When two interlocutors successfully communicate we 
can describe what this success consists in by appealing to this identity of 
species, that is, to the existence of a certain constancy or regularity in 
the space of mental acts of the relevant community of language-using 
subjects. 
5. The Place of Mental Acts 
Now whilst Brentano and Husserl have shown that an ontological 
theory can be developed which can do justice to the structures of acts, it 
remains the case - as is unavoidable, given the nature of the subject-
matter - that such an ontology is both problematic and highly com-
plex. There remains, therefore, a certain temptation to ignore acts and 
to look instead at linguistic expressions. Such expressions are after all 
obviously and cleanly separable from each other and - in non-Cretan 
cases - from associated referents. They also have the advantage of 
being publicly accessible. Further, many of the structures of acts are ma-
nifested also in the kinds of things we say, and thus the linguistic study 
of descriptions or reports of mental acts may well have light to throw on 
such structures, were its advocates once freed of the tendency to read in-
---- -------- ---~-----------------~ ------- -------- -T 
1. 
214 BARRY SMITH 
to the domain of acts structural simplifications derived from the spheres 
of logic or language. 16 
More often, however, the philosophical investigation of language has 
been held to enable the by-passing of theoretical concern with mental acts 
through the study of thos.e overt actions in which language gets used. As 
is shown already by the work of Reinach, there is much in the action-
centred approach which makes it congenial to the ontological position 
defended here. It is an approach which rejects the conception of language 
as a matter of abstract types, turning away from abstract models in 
general and paying attention instead to the real events, scattered through 
time and space, in which language gets used. Modern philosophers of 
action argue further, however, that the sympathetic treatment of such 
real events makes the appeal to mental acts unnecessary. 
It was Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), in particular, who had the aim 
of dislodging theoretical or cognitive acts from the preeminence they have 
enjoyed in post-Cartesian philosophy. 17 Deeper than any agreement in 
judgment, Wittgenstein insists, is agreement in habits and traditions. If 
mental acts exist at all, then they are a derivative phenomenon, owing 
whatever status they might have to their manifestations in overt behaviour. 
It is indeed tempting to agree with Wittgenstein that the examination 
of overt expressions, and of all that is bound up therewith, will go some 
way tow~rd making superfluous the direct investigation of the structures 
of acts, indeed that there is a a subservience of descriptions of mental 
episodes to descriptions of what is public or overt. Even then, however, 
it would be important to understand the precise nature of the ontologi-
cal relations between mental acts and overt utterances, and an examina-
tion of Wittgenstein's work very soon reveals that - in marked contrast 
to Husserl - he simply does not have the theoretical resources available 
to establish what these relations might be. He was thereby constrained, 
like Frege before him, and like the formal semanticists whom he at-
tacked, to adopt an unrealistic position to the effect that mental acts are 
somehow incidental epiphenomena, superfluous shadows, lacking in cog-
nitive value or theoretical relevance. 
Now there are, trivially, three alternatives regarding the dependence 
relations oetween mental acts and overt or public linguistic behaviour: 
(I) the former are one-sidedly dependent on the latter, ,(II) the latter is 
dependent on the former, (Ill) the two are mutually dependent on each 
other. 
(I) is clearly unacceptable (one need only try to imagine what it 
would be like to have uses of language without mental· acts); yet this 
seems to be what is involved in the extreme thesis to the effect that men-
tal acts are merely derivative epiphenomena. 
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(II) implies the Cartesian thesis according to which language is di-
spensable (is a mere 'clothing of thought'). Consider Hans, who is alone 
in his room, thinking hard about whether or not Erna really loves him. 
Hans arrives at a number of conclusions which he considers, rejects, and 
so on. In Hans's judgments Erna occurs again and again, different pre~ 
dicates are attributed to her in succession, now in memory, now in ima-
gination. Do we not have here a freedom of variation of Hans's mental 
acts with respect to the level of overt expression? Certainly what Hans 
thinks is independent of what he would say were he to communicate his 
judgments to, say, his brother Otto. But does this imply that language is 
a mere 'dispensable clothing'? 
More careful consideration shows that Hans's thoughts are in fact 
only locally independent of linguistic utterances. All of these silent judg-
ings are still globally dependent on language in the sense that they are 
of such a complexity that they could not occur unless language existed 
(unless the facility existed in Hans to use the expressions of a natural 
language and to manifest this facility in overt actions). It is this fact, al-
so, which explains why there is a subservience of descriptions of mental 
episodes to descriptions of what is public or overt. 18 
Which leaves us with (III). Language is clearly dependent on thought, 
or rather on mental acts in general, since there can be no learning of 
language (and no communication at all) without e.g. the exercise of as-
sociated perceptions. And thought is also dependent on language in the 
(global) sense just mentioned. This two-sided dependence is first of all a 
developmental thesis: language cannot be learned except against a back-
ground which includes, e.g., acts of perception. But more: it seems that, 
beyond a certain threshold of complexity, mental acts cannot occur ex-
cept against a simultaneously existing background which involves lingui-
stic habits and skills which have been inculcated publicly (habits and 
skills which will of course manifest dependence relations of their own, 
on different levels). This gives rise to a further set of problems for an 
ontology of language, problems having to do with the relations between 
the mental and the social. 
6. Against Cartesianism 
The present paper, for all its talk of acts, is not an exercise in Hus-
serlian phenomenology, i.e. in the description of those parts or moments 
of acts that are transparent to their subjects. Our use of 'act' differs es-
sentially from the favoured use of the later Husserl, who 
~------ - - - ----- - - - - ---- - - - - -----
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e~cl~des from the notion of an act any 'extra-experiential' or 'non-phenomenolo-
gical elements that may be connected with them. By an act Husserl means just that 
component of an intentional event of consciousness that the subject himself can dis-
cern by 'reflecting' on his experience, excluding empirical facts about the intended 
object an,d its ~e f~c~o relation to the subj_ect. Hence, an act is just what we might 
call the expenent1al component of an mtentional event, 'purified' (as Husserl 
says) of presumptions concerning its 'interlacing with nature' (Woodruff Smith & 
McIntyre 1982: 3). 
On~ pri~c~pal thesis of the paper - which finds support both in the 
reah~t cntiqu~ _of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology (as expressed 
e_.g. m_ the wntmgs of_ lngarden) and also in more recent work by analy-
tic philosophers on smgular reference, indexicality, de re belief, de re 
perception and the like (see e.g. Evans 1982 and Woodfield 1982) - is 
th~t this Cartesia~ approach to the structures of acts is radically miscon-
~eived. Acts are simply one further variety of individual entity, existing 
m the real world along with substances, processes, states and events of 
other kinds. 19 Acts differ from most other real entities in the fact that 
we can have some privileged or 'inner' access to them. But, this access is 
(almost always?) partial. And the fact that it is available should not 
blind us to the_ fact that, as real events in the spatio-temporal world, 
~cts a~e susceptible also to various sorts of objective or public access -
mcludmg access via our linguistic expressions - making possible a de-
scription of their ontological structure in a way which is no different in 
principle, from that which can be provided for entities of other so;ts. 
Cartesian assumptions remain powerful in contemporary philosophy 
however, for ex~ple in the form in which they have been revived by 
F?dor as the doctrme of 'methodological solipsism' (see Fodor 1981). It 
will thus be useful to underline why it is that they lead their proponents 
astray. Such assumptions may be summarised in the two-fold thesis to 
the effect that 
(i) each individual human consciousness has a privileged access to his 
own mental phenomena; 
(ii) the mental phenomena of each individual subject constitute a 
self-contained domain, somehow effectively isolable from the order of 
nature in such a way that our mental experience in its entirety would be 
exactly as it is even though the external world did not exist. · 
The idea that each consciousness has a privileged access to his own 
acts can be _challenged on a number of fronts. It corresponds linguisti-
cally to the idea that mental verbs should be glossed as opaque in all oc-
currences of use (cf. Husserl 1984, §§ 4f.; Simons 1983). Yet the nor-
mal _o~ unmarked sense of such verbs is transparent, the opaque sense 
requmng a special setting, such as the report of a psychiatric patient or 
dream-teller or vision-seer, this report and its evaluation being indepen-
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dent of the existenc.e or otherwise of a corresponding referent. (One 
such special setting is provided by the philosophical activity known as 
descriptive phenomenology.) Further, the opaque reading of a mental 
verb must be parasitic on the transparent reading: for when such a verb 
is interpreted in the opaque sense, the associated object-clause is read as 
giving an account of what the subject is aware of in the relevant expe-
rience indirectly: by seeming to give a description of an object, the 
transparent experience of which by a normal subject would involve him 
in having experiences relevantly similar to the subject in question. 
The second component in the assumption of Cartesianism has been 
challenged above all by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein rejects the idea that 
there is a discriminable totality of all of that to which the subject has 
'inner' access on the grounds that our ability to find our way around the 
parts of such a totality would of necessity depend upon capacities ac-
quired whilst moving in the domain of what is publicly accessible. There 
is no way, he insists, in which a self-contained stratum of 'consciousness' 
could be carved out from the plethora of forms of interaction, both ac-
tive and passive, overt and covert, of a human being with its animate 
and inanimate environment. And from this it follows that any putative 
classifications of private objects must obscure at least some important 
structural traits of the phenomena to be described. 
Both our mental life and our overt actions rest on expressed and 
unexpressed habits and traditions, acquired above all through education 
and upbringing and through our experiences of the actions of others (in-
cluding actions of correction and constraint provoked by our own overt 
• behaviour). It is this background of shared traditions which makes our 
mental life, and our own understanding of our mental life, possible. By 
shaping and determining our overt utterances it thereby indirectly shapes 
and determines the repertoire of types of act which we have at our dis-
posal, and at the same time ensures that the deployment of this reper-
toire is to a large extent a matter of ingrained reflex - or at least a 
matter over which we have only very fragmentary conscious control. 
Thus even the mental acts which occur are not such that they admit of 
any transparent access. 
It will be clear, again, that such Wittgensteinian arguments should 
not be seen as implying that there are no mental acts. Wittgenstein has 
shown only that a totality of mental acts cannot be separated out from 
its surroundings, and above all that such a totality cannot be separated 
out from the public domain constituted by the actions, and especially 
the speech actions, in which we engage. But what cannot be separated 
out, what does not exist independently of its surroundings, does not there-
by lose its claim to exist. One of the presuppositions of Wittgenstein's 
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philosophy is precisely that there is no such thing as a dependent or 
non-separable existent. For if it made sense to distinguish between inde-
pendent and dependent existents then it would make sense to talk of 
things having an a priori order, and this is something that Wittgenstein 
denies again and again throughout his work. 20 
7. Husserl's Noema Theory of Meaning 
Sometime after the publication of the Logical Investigations, Husserl 
himself abandoned the theory of linguistic meaning as species and intro-
duced a new view of meanings as special abstract entities, which he called 
noemata. 
Anglo-Saxon readers of Husserl - indeed almost all his commenta-
tors - have interpreted his development from the Investigations to the 
Ideas in a way which takes for granted that the teleology which Hussed 
himself retrospectively inscribed upon his changes of mind - his 'deve-
lopment' - has some basis in the facts themselves. Thus it has been as-
sumed that Husserl's rejection of the theory of meaning as species in fa-
vour of the theory of meaning as noema was somehow justified. This 
assumption seems, however, to be supported only by appeal to what 
Husserl himself has to say about the matter (after he has already given 
up the earlier position), and by the presence of a number of peripheral, 
if intriguing, similarities between the noema theory and the theory of 
Sinne developed by Frege in his "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung". His ne-
vertheless interesting to spend some time examining the later theory, 
particularly in the refined form it has been given by F!/lllesdal, McIntyre 
and Woodruff Smith, since this may be said to combine many of the be-
nefits of the language-based approach with a framework within which 
mental acts are capable of being taken seriously. 21 
On Husserl's earlier (species) theory, if Erna understands what Hans 
says, then this is because Hans's and Erna's thoughts are instances of 
the same species (at some level of generality), a fact which is itself to be 
understood in terms of certain kinds of constancy (similarity of parts) in 
the space of mental acts - constancy which has come about through a 
certain historical process (Hans and Erna share the same background of 
habits and skills). On the later (noema) theory no such historical ac-
count is possible, for we are dealing not with constancy amidst real va-
riation, but with abstract meaning-entities outside space and time. Hans 
succeeds in communicating with Erna, on this account, because the 
meaning of his utterance, a certain abstract noematic Sinn, becomes the 
meaning of Erna's act of registering this utterance. It is as if the noema-
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tic Sinne are stars in an abstract heaven to which our successive acts, 
and even the successive acts of distinct subjects, may - somehow - be 
identically directed. 
So far, so Fregean. 
Husserl's noema theory can be said to be superior to Frege's in at 
least one respect however. For Husserl provides an account of the noe-
mata or Sinne of all acts: perceptual, imaginative, judgmental, etc., 
where Frege can cope only with judgmental acts, or more specifically 
with the language bound up with specific sorts of judgmental act. This 
is an important advantage, since if we want to deal, e.g., with indexical 
uses of language ('That bird is flying high'), we shall find it necessary to 
recognise that the relevant utterances can be meaningful only if they oc-
cur as parts of larger wholes which include acts of perception directed 
toward non-linguistic objects. 22 In this very advantage of Husserl's later 
theory lies a danger however. For the structure and individuation condi-
tions of abstract noemata are essentially derived from our understanding 
of the logical structures of corresponding linguistic expressions. (This, 
surely, is the central message of the new 'Frege-Husserl semantics'.) If, 
therefore, we insist that abstract noemata are such as to exhaust the 
meanings also of perceptual acts, then we would seem to be trying to 
bring into coincidence two entirely different sorts of structure - having 
different sorts of multiplicity. For the structures of linguistic meanings 
are discrete, subject to those sorts of non-continuous variation which 
come about through the divisions and combinations dictated e.g. by the 
rules of syntax. The structures of perceptual contents, in contrast, are 
continuously variable along a number of qualitatively highly specific di-
mensions, in a way which implies that it is impossible that there could 
ever be a fitting together of the two of the sort that is required by the 
newly fashionable interpretations of Husserl's later theory. 
The earlier theory, on the other hand, which draws a sharp line be-
tween the two sorts of content, is subject to no such danger. And in 
other respects, too, the comparison between Husserl's own successive 
theories of meaning is not at all to the disadvantage of the former. In-
deed neither in Husserl, nor in contemporary proponents of the noema, 
is any argument given for favouring the later theory rather than the ear-
lier. This is true not least· because the earlier theory is not, in any of the 
secondary literature, worked out in detail. 23 
When Husserl's two successive theories are compared, we see a num-
ber of advantages of the former. This is so, first of all, in regard to 
their respective ontological commitments. Both theories accept the need 
for mental acts as real events (in the later theory these are called 'noe-
ses'). Further, both accept the need for some account of generality. In-
------
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deed the later theory distinguishes (and this is just for starters): the noe-
matic Sinn of an act, the matter of the act which 'entertains' this Sinn 
(a certain real moment), the essence or species of this matter, and in 
principle also the essence or species of the noematic Sinn. 24 The earlier 
theory, in contrast, has only acts (certain real events), their parts, and 
the species these instantiate, and we have seen that even the latter need 
not, of necessity, be taken ontologically seriously. 
Further, the relations of species to instance and of part to whole to 
which the early theory appeals are well understood. The later theory, in 
contrast, needs relations capable of embracing as their relata both ab-
stract and concrete entities (as if such heterogeneous entities could be ca-
pable of being combined together within a single whole). As Woodruff 
Smith and McIntyre inadvertantly reveal, 25 the intermediary role of ab-
stract noemata saddles us with two insoluble problems: 
(i) the problem of entertaining, i.e. the problem of the relation of the 
noema to concrete mental episodes. (How can a real mental event exist 
together with an abstract noema/Sinn within a single whole?) 
(ii) the problem of anchorage, i.e. the problem of the relation of the 
noema to concrete objects. (How can a mental act, in somehow grasping 
an abstract noema, thereby be directed or referred e.g. to a concrete 
thing?) 
Woodruff Smith and McIntyre's own suggested solution to the first 
of these two problems operates at the level of metaphor. An act, they 
say, 
intends (is directed toward or is intentionally related to) an object if and only if the 
act (or its noesis) entertains a certain noematic Sinn and that Sinn prescribes that 
object (WS & M: 143). 
But what is this 'entertaining', which appears to be a peculiar sort of 
non-intentional intentionality? 26 It seems, indeed, that the word 'enter-
tains' can elucidate nothing. It merely recalls an exactly parallel problem 
in the interpretation of Fregean philosophy, the problem of giving an 
account of the relation of Fassen between an act of thinking and a Fre-
gean Gedanke (cf. Willard 1984: 180 ff.).'27 It is perhaps significant that 
Woodruff Smith and McIntyre find no further analysis of entertaining 
in Husserl's own writings. Rather than accepting this as sufficient evi-
dence of a major flaw, either in their interpretation of Husserl's theory 
or in the theory itself - that perhaps a view of the relation between act 
and meaning along the lines of the earlier theory might be right after all 
- they take refuge behind a set-theoretical analysis of 'entertaining', 
conceiving it as a 'many-one or functional relation' (WS & M:, 146). But 
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in order to support this view (cf. their chs. 6 and 7) yields (at best) no-
thing more than a rather shaky structural analogy; it does not tell us 
what the ontological status of these peculiar abstracta and of the asso-
ciated relations might conceivably be. 
In regard to the problem of anchorage, Husserl himself was ultimate-
ly to by-pass this problem by abandoning the attempt to establish con-
tact between noema and world (the insidious pressure of the noema 
theory in the direction of 'transcendental idealism'). For it seems that 
the noema theory is unable to specify which objects acts are directed to-
wards. Noemata are abstract entities (they are rather like the 'concepts' 
of old). In no sense are they tied up with or sensitive to the concrete and 
individual spatio-temporal entities which (as we normally conceive 
things) people the world of our experience. Thus the noema theorist has 
no way to distinguish, say, thinking-about-McIntyre from thinking-
about-some-philosopher-qualitatively-indistinguishable-from-Mcintyre. 
To succeed in describing a particular person's thinking-about-McIntyre 
(his being minded in just this way), we need to recognise that his acts, 
and their background, are tied to a certain segment of reality (that they 
are one-sidedly dependent upon certain objects, in the sense of our dis-
cussion above 28). 
Something similar holds even where there is no object of our act, e.g. 
where we are thinking (as we conceive things) about the god Jupiter. For 
here, too, there is a problem of anchorage: even our acts of thinking-
about-Jupiter need to be distinguished from acts of thinking-about-
some-god-qualitatively-identical-with-Jupiter, and to this end they must 
be tied into a certain complex background which includes ancient Medi-
terranean peoples, their religious beliefs, traditions and practices, and 
the remnants and reports which survive in various media and inform us 
of these. 29 This is another dimension in which Husserlian phenomenolo-
gy is inadequate to the ontology of acts: it fails to do justice to this 
background, which exists in virtue of a network of foundation relations 
between any given act and the objects of prior acts with which it is asso-
ciated. 
The response of the noema-theorist is to seek to simulate this mun-
dane background by complicating his account of the mutual interre-
lations among acts, by appealing to what is called the act's horizon 
(Ideas I § 149). 
The clearest account of this matter is provided by Woodruff Smith 
and McIntyre in their ch. 5. Every act, they tell us, has a horizon, fixed 
by specific components of the act's Sinn together with parts of the sub-
ject's conceptual scheme or belief-system. Now it is of course reasonable 
to seek to extend the phenomenology of the act by recognising a role for i 
11 
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background beliefs, even those background beliefs that are not "active" 
phenomena of consciousness in the way the act itself is l:WS & M: 254). 
We could see this background as somehow latent in an act, present in it 
"in the form of a habitus" (EU § 25, cf. also § 67b). The Husserl of 
'horizons' and 'noemata' is not, however, operating with real events and 
states and with their real cumulation through time, nor with that back-
ground of knowledge that is actually acquired in our p;ist experience. He 
is operating, rather, with peculiar non-actual dispositions. 30 Thus he 
sees an act's horizon as consisting of various possible acts, in which the 
object of the initial act would be intended under various further aspects, 
with details filled in about (say) those sides of the object that are origi-
nally hidden from view (WS & M: 239). The horizon of an act of per-
ception, for example, would consist of perceptions the perceiver could 
have had in the past (and indeed in the future also) (WS & M: 259). The 
noematic Sinne of these merely possible components of the horizon are 
then held, as if by magic, to contribute to determining which object the 
act is directed towards: 
!he complete 'meaning' of an individuative act, as we have described it, typically 
mcludes not only the Sinn that is actually and 'explicitly' present in the act, ... but 
also the system of Sinne correlated with certain related background beliefs. A com-
plete phenomenological analysis of the act must embrace those Sinne as well ... be-
cause it is [they] that ultimately prescribe which individual the act is directed to-
ward or is about. (WS & M: 390) 
The problem of objective reference is hereby however shunted off into a 
corner of dark 'potentialities'. Not only is this appeal subject to the ob-
jection that it is an account of what is real in terms of what is merely 
possible. Even on its own terms it is not adequate to do the job which it 
has set itself: no account of the phenomenology of a person's acts, not 
even when the implicit or latent 'horizon' of these acts is taken into ac-
count, not even when their various 'sedimentations' are taken into ac-
count, can ensure for these acts the appropriate referent. For again, 
even the complicated horizonal background could in principle occur else-
where, e.g. on Putnam's twin-earth. To anchor putative reference to 
'our' Jupiter and his background as distinct from twin~Jupiter and his 
background we need an indispensable relational element, and this means 
breaking out of the phenomenological circle and takinK the acts of the 
subject in their natural setting, intervolved in manifold ways with the 
rest of the natural world. 
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NOTES 
1) I should like to thank the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung for the award of a 
grant for research in Louvain and Erlangen where this paper was written. It owes a great 
deal to Kevin Mulligan, and grew out of a collaboration with him on the essays - Mulli-
gan & Smith 1986a and 1986b - listed in the bibliography below. Thanks are due also to 
Karl Schuhmann for helpful comments. 
2) Assuming, of course, that it has an object. 
3) I shall concentrate in what follows on empirical uses of sentences in a natural set-
ting, sentences for which it seems reasonable to assume that some truth-maker exists. See 
Mulligan, Simons & Smith 1984. 
4) See especially pp. 20-27, 88-103 of Brentano 1982 and also Mulligan & Smith 1985 
for a discussion in English. 
5) See e.g. LU II § 3. The real parts in question are sometimes called by Brentano and 
Husserl 'logical parts': see Brentano 1982 (p. 20), Mulligan and Smith 1985, and LU III 
§§ If. 
6) See also, more lately, Prior 1949 and Searle 1959. The fact that Husserl's under-
standing of logic and ontology and of form and matter rests on the assumption of the 
tree-structure of species is evident from his repeated discussions e.g. of lowest species and 
differentiae, of species and genera, of ideal singulars, etc. See e.g. LU "Prolegomena" §§ 
46, 70; I§§ 31, 33; II§ 26; III§§ 7a, !Of., 16, 22; IV§ 7; V § 26. Compare also Husserl's 
letter to Lipps of Jan. 1904 (Schuhmann 1977), and Willard 1984 (e.g., p. 64). That this 
background of Aristotelian ontology was important to Husserl is clear also from the first 
chapter of the first book of the Ideen - and we can conjecture that he included this ex-
tensive treatment of the Aristotelian theory of generality precisely because he was con-
cerned by the lack of understanding of his intentions in the earlier work. 
7) Thus in LU Ill § 14 Husserl refers to "the great scientific interest that the constitu-
tion of a deductive theoretical transformation claims in every field". "Nothing can show 
up the value of an exact determination more clearly than the possibility of giving a deduc-
tive proof of such propositions as are familiar to us in a different guise." (Emphasis 
mine.) The theoretical interest of the idea of dependence derives also from the fact that, as 
Husserl has shown, it can contribute to the understanding of a range of other central for-
mal ontological notions. The work of Ingarden (1964-65) suggests further that by distingui-
shing between different notions of dependence one can produce a theory of great power in 
the domain of general metaphysics. 
8) See the works by Mulligan, Simons and Smith (and aggregates thereof) in the list of 
references below. 
9) For references see Mel'cuk 1979, Schachter 1980. 
10) See Mulligan (forthcoming b.) and also Smith 1986a and 1986b for further details. 
11) On act-based theories of meaning in general and on Husserl's theory in particular 
see Smith 1986a. 
12) This account ~pplies strictly speaking only to what Husserl calls objectifying acts, 
but si,nce all other acts - for example episodic emotional phenomena - are themselves 
one~sidedly founded on objectifying acts, the matter-quality-intuitive content distinction is 
in effect inherited by these also. Cf. LU V § 41. 
13) Husserl's distinction between quality and matter had its origins in the distinction 
between act, content, and object first clearly formulated by Twardowski 1894. The opposi-
tion between the content and object of an act is in its turn often compared with Frege's 
opposition between the sense and reference of an expression. It is necessary to emphasise 
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already here, however, that the matter of an act as Husserl understands it in the LU can-
not be equated with any abstract entity (e.g. with a 'proposition' or a Sinn). For act mat-
ters are real, individual parts of mental events; abstract entities, in contrast (if they exist at 
all), are outside space and time. 
14) Compare the account of noticing put forward by Brentano (1982: 31-64; see also 
Wenning (forthcoming) and Stephens 1978: 138f). Clearly not all complexity in the object 
of perception is mirrored by a corresponding complexity of the act. 
15) The 'roughly' is inserted here in order to draw attention to the fact that not all 
parts and moments of those concrete mental events through which uses of language get 
their meaning are relevant to this meaning. For further details see Smith 1986b. 
16) Some philosophers have even gone so far as to impose a sentential form upon 
simple acts of perception (such that my seeing the on-coming fist is already a 'disguised 
judgment'): see Mulligan, Simons & Smith 1984. The view that perceiving is propositional 
is not an invention of analytic philosophers - there may be traces of the idea even in 
Hume and the first major attack on the idea is in Husserl's fifth Logical Investigation. 
17) See also Russell's Analysis of Mind, where acts are dispensed with in a context 
which involves explicit reference to Brentano and Meinong. 
18) This distinction between global and local independence, as also the arguments for 
its employment in this case, are due to Kevin Mulligan. 
19) See Mulligan & Smith 1986b, for a more detailed elaboration of this thesis. 
20) See, e.g., Tractatus 5.634, Zettel, § 357. The line of thinking in the present para-
graph owes a lot to discussions with Kevin Mulligan. 
21) I shall concentrate in what follows on Woodruff Smith and McIntyre's book of 
1982 (abbreviated as WS & M). The book is an excellent example of Husserlian thought of 
the sort that has been sadly lacking since the heyday of phenomenology in the early years 
of the century, and I am grateful to its authors for useful discussions of its content. I hope 
that no apology is needed for tile somewhat critical tone of my treatment, for I have of 
course passed over in silence those points in the book with which I am in agreement. 
22) See Mulligan & Smith 1986a. It was above all Karl Biihler who developed Husserl's 
ideas in the direction of a general theory of indexicality: see Mulligan (forthcoming a.). 
23) A single, noble exception to this general trend is the work of Dallas Willard, above 
all his 1972 and 1984. See also Hoche 1973 (p. 203), and Kiing 1976, who give textual evi-
dence that Husserl very belatedly entertained the view that his position at the time of the 
LU was possibly right after all. 
24) For a fuller account - minus the dimension of essence or species - see the dia-
gram on p. 136 of Woodruff Smith and McIntyre's book. 
25) Cf. their diagram on p. 143. 
26) Thus we are told for example that entertaining a Sinn 'does not require any explicit 
awareness of the Sinn by the subject who so entertains it' (p. 144). 
27) The metaphor of entertaining recalls also the central weakness in once popular ac-
counts of belief and other 'propositional attitudes' as a matter of a believer's being direc-
ted towards an abstract 'proposition'. 
28) See Smith 1984 for a view along these lines. 
29) I am grateful to Peter Simons for this point: see his 1983. 
30) Woodruff Smith and McIntyre sometimes suggest further that these horizons are 
like noemata in being abstract entities, which would imply that they were entirely outside 
the temporal domain of what happens and is the case. I shall ignore this question here. 
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